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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTMANN DECISION ON
FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES
Milena Sterio'

INTRODUCTION

The law of state succession is one of the most complicated areas of law. 1
Scholars and politicians have seldom reached a consensus on the exact public
international law rules in this area. The recent breakup of former Yugoslavia2
exemplifies some of the difficulties relating to, inter alia, the distinction between
dissolution and secession, the allocation of debt and assets among successor states,
and more particularly, the resolution of individual disputes among citizens of
former Yugoslav republics. The latter issue has been particularly important, as
numerous individuals have lost their life savings and immovable property during
the internal war that ravaged former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These individuals
are now seeking restitution from successor states. However, the question of
liability for former Yugoslavia's republics has not been fully resolved even though
individuals may begin bringing their claims to international tribunals.
It is possible that such individuals will start looking toward other jurisdictions,
including the United States. A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision 3 expands the
applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA")4 by allowing private
individuals to sue foreign states under the FSIA for conduct that occurred prior to
its enactment in 1976. This decision might indicate a willingness on behalf of
American courts to hear more claims against foreign sovereigns for violations of
international law. Thus, claimholders from former Yugoslavia could now be more
inclined to bring their grievances to U.S. district courts under the FSIA.
In order to address this issue, Part I of this article will describe the breakup of
former Yugoslavia, by first addressing general succession issues before
concentrating on the more specific questions of property allocation among
successor states. Part II will present the recent Supreme Court decision by
outlining its holding and its limitations. Finally, Part III will discuss the

* Associate, New York City law firm. This Article represents the views of the author only and
not those of her law firm. B.A., Rutgers College; J.D., Cornell Law School; Maitrise en Droit,
Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne; D.E.A. Private International Law, Universite Paris 1-Pantheon
Sorbonne.
1.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 654 (4th ed. 1990).
2.
Before its breakup, former Yugoslavia was known as Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("SFRY''). See The Agreement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of
the Former State of Yugoslavia, June 29, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Vienna Agreement].
3.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. 2240 (2004).
4.
28 u.s.c. § 1602 (2000).
39
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implications of this recent decision on former Yugoslavia's claimholders' prospects
of introducing successful FSIA-based claims to American tribunals. Part III will
end with a discussion regarding the utility and fairness of allowing more claims
against foreign sovereigns, such as the former Yugoslav republics, to be litigated in
U.S. courts. 5
I.

THE BREAKUP OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The dismantlement of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was not an easy
process. Besides the internal wars and atrocious human rights violations
throughout the country, numerous state succession issues plagued the dissolution
process. Because of the sensitive political context and tension among former
republics, negotiations have been difficult and even when a final agreement was
reached in Vienna in 2003, 6 the most sensitive issues were deliberately left out.
Thus, it is now up to the new states to bilaterally resolve such issues, which involve
restitution to citizens of former Yugoslavia who lost their property during the wars,
as well as the allocation of successor states' responsibility regarding the
wrongdoings of the post-World War II communist regime. Since successor states'
governments might be slow and inefficient in providing a solution to these issues,
private plaintiffs with pending claims could bring their disputes to international
tribunals in hope of faster relief. No international forums have yet ruled on the
merits of any such claims, but recent developments in European and American
jurisprudence might indicate the international community's willingness to deal with
former Yugoslavia's succession issues.
A.

General Context

When former Yugoslavia ceased to exist in the early 1990s, its dismantlement
caused many legal problems regarding the allocation of the country's property. In
particular, the issue of debt and asset distribution has plagued succession
negotiations among successor states.' The difficulty underlying the issue of
property allocation is both legal and political, as the country has been tom apart by
violence and internal wars. Deciding whether the country's breakup amounted to
secession or to dissolution carries important consequences regarding debt and asset
distribution because this determination affects successor states' legal and political
rights in a crucial manner. With the help of the international community, an
agreement was finally reached among successor states in Vienna in 2001. 8

5. In fact, this article uses former Yugoslavia as an example, but the same reasoning, regarding
jurisdiction in U.S. courts under the FSIA over a foreign sovereign, can be equally applied to other
recently dismantled states, such as the former USSR and the former Czechoslovakia.
6.
See Part 1.A.3 infra for a full discussion of this Agreement.
7.
Milos Trifkovic, Fundamental Controversies in Succession to the Former SFR Yugoslavia,
in 33 SUCCESSION OF STATES: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 188 (Mojmir Mrak ed.).
8.
See Vienna Agreement, supra note 2.
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However, while this agreement resolved some of the outstanding issues, other
problems still exist among former Yugoslav republics.
1.

The Conflict and Crisis in Former Yugoslavia

In the late 1980s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY")
suffered a financial crisis. 9 Because of poor economic planning and populist
promises, the Yugoslav federation experienced such a staggering inflation rate that
the federal government launched a "shock therapy" plan intended to curb inflation
and to boost foreign investment. 10 The country's political situation paralleled the
economic debacle. In 1990, new nationalistic movements started forming in
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new political pluralism was
clearly anti-communist and anti-federation, and new nationalist parties won
elections throughout the year. 11 In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was elected
president with 65% popular vote. 12 Thereafter, the Serbian Assembly suspended
Kosovo's government and parliament, signaling rising nationalism and a rejection
of decentralization of the political and economic systems. 13
Several political forces emerged thereon. On one side, Milosevic advocated a
"strong Serbia" as the leading force in a "strong Yugoslavia." On the other side,
the newly elected governments of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
were fighting for decentralization and independence from the Yugoslav federation.
Several other factors contributed to this troubling internal situation. First, the
military was seen as mostly Serbian in its higher cadres and as strongly pro
federation, which caused suspicion about the role of the army within the other
republics. 14 Second, the Serbian leadership's attempt to maintain a centralizing
policy came at a time of great distress. In fact, the 1990 economic package,
launched under an International Monetary Fund ("IMF') Stand-by Agreement and
a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan, "required large budget cuts and
redirection of federal revenues toward debt servicing."is In order to implement this
requirement, the federal government suspended transfer payments to the

9.
See Valerie Bunce, The Elusive Peace in the Former Yugoslavia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
709, 712 (1995) on the economical situation of Yugoslavia.
10. Guido Acquaviva, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Fate of its Financial Obligations,
30DENV.J.INT'LL.&POL'Y 173, 174(2002).
11. See Konrad G. Buhler, State Succession, Identity/Continuity and Membership in the United
Nations, in LA SUCCESSION D'ETATS: LA CODIFICATION A L'EPREUVE DES FAITS - STATE
SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TEsTED AGAINST THE FACTS I87, 274-78 (Pierre Michel Eisemann &
Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000).
12. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at I74.
13. See Buhler, supra note I I, at 274-78.
I4. For an interesting analysis of the spreading of Yugoslav nationalism(s), see OLIVIER
LADISLAV KUBLI, Du NATIONALISME YOUGOSLAVE Aux NATIONALISMES POST-YOUGOSLAVES
(I 998); see also LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF ANATION ( 1996).
15. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at I75.
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government of the republics and autonomous provinces, thereby creating more
discomfort and distrust toward the federal authorities. 16
The international community was mostly unwilling to deal with this troubling
situation. 17 While the international focus of the world in 1991 remained on the Gulf
War and on Moscow.is the first military outbreaks took place in Croatia. Serbs
from the Krajina region declared their willingness to remain part of Yugoslavia in a
local referendum. Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian leader, and Milosevic secretly met
to discuss possible partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 19 Slovenia and Croatia
declared their sovereignty at the end of June, followed by Macedonia20 in
September. The European Community ("EC") began an arms embargo in July, in
an effort to ease the situation. 21 Furthermore, the EC established a "Peace
Conference" on Yugoslavia22 , and the United Nations Security Council adopted a
resolution for an embargo on arms sales to Yugoslavia. 23 However, these efforts
remained virtually useless regarding conflict resolution in Yugoslavia and the
international community did little to propose any real action or diplomatic solution
for the developing crisis.
In October 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia
were on the verge of becoming independent states, leaving Serbia and Montenegro
as the two remaining constituents of the Yugoslav federation. On April 27, 1992,
Serbia and Montenegro declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") to be
the "continuation" of the dismantled SFRY. 24 In the meantime, the EC decided to
take a bold stand: it would only recognize newly independent countries in Eastern

16. MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY 246 (1997). See also SUSAN
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLtrnON AFTER THE COLD WAR 40 (1995).
17. The United States, the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and Russia seemed to support the idea of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav
federation. This attitude strengthened the perception of the Yugoslav and Serbian leaderships that
independence for Slovenia, Croatia, and any other republic was not supported internationally. See Marc
Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 570 (1992).
18. In one of the strangest coups in history, the leader of the former USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev,
was declared "sick" and then promptly came back under the protective wing of Boris Yeltsin.
Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 175-76.
19. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 175.
20. Macedonia is now recognized under the name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"
and it was admitted to the United Nations in April of 1993. See Susan Woodward, Are International
Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 471, 473 (1996). For the purpose of this
article, the denomination of "Macedonia" will be adopted.
21. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 176.
22. The EC agreed to convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia at a meeting held in Brussels
on August 27, 1991. The peace conference was also to establish an arbitration procedure to enhance the
rule of law in the settlement of disputes. After many disagreements, an Arbitration Commission was
formed with Mr. Badinter as Chairman. The Commission [hereinafter Badinter Commission] received
full support from the United States and the USSR, but was replaced by the UN/EC International
Conference on Yugoslavia in August of 1992. For more information on the Badinter Commission, see
Maurizio Ragazzi, Introductory Note, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 311.L.M. 1488, 1488-90 (1992).
23. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIRESnl3 (1991), available at www.un.org (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
24. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 178.
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Europe if they were able to meet stringent criteria, 25 new to the international law on
state recognition. 26 While these new standards, had they been followed by the EC
itself and other major countries, such as the United States, non-aligned countries,
and the newly indepen~ent Russia, could have promoted a more coherent approach
toward state recognition, they remained short-lived. At the end of 1991, Germany
decided to unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries,
choosing not to adhere to the previously agreed-on substantive standards. 27 The
rest of the EC followed on January 15, 1992, recognizing the same two former
Yugoslav republics without following the proposed standards. The EC then
recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 6, 1992, 28 but refused to do so
regarding Macedonia. 29 The United States, too, recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.30 The recognition of these new countries
happened while horrific war crimes and human rights violations were taking place

25. See The Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union, available at http://ejil.org/journaVVoll4/Nol/art6.html [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines
were issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, on December 16, 1991, as part of the
Declaration on Yugoslavia. In the Guidelines, member states agreed to "recognize, subject to the
normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case, those new states which,
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have
accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a
peaceful process and to negotiations." See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 90-91 (1992). The Guidelines explained that the process of
recognition required, inter alia, "commitment to settle by agreement [ ...] all questions regarding state
succession and regional disputes." For a discussion regarding the relevance of this specification, see
European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States, 31 LL.M. 1485, 1487 (1992).
26. Scholars in international law generally agree that an entity satisfying the four criteria of
statehood (territory, permanent population, government and capacity to conduct international relations)
does not need any kind of recognition by the international community to become a member. See
generally P.K. MENON, TuE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).
27. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 5, On the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by
the European Community and its Member States, Jan. ll, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1503, 1505 [hereinafter
Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 5] (suggesting Croatia was not fully "ready" to be recognized
because the Constitution of December 4, 1991 did not sufficiently incorporate the suggested provision
on the autonomy of minorities; however, written reiteration by President Tudjman of the commitment to
protect minorities was deemed sufficient). As for Slovenia, see Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 7,
On International Recognition of the Republic of Slovenia by the European Community and its Member
States, Jan 11, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1512, 1512-17 (declaring that Slovenia met the requirements). On the
question of legality of secession by Croatia and Slovenia, see Richard lglar, Comment, The
Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and
Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 228 (1992).
28. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 4, On International Recognition of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the European Community and its Member States, Jan ll, 1992, 31
LL.M. 1501, 1503. On the particular international situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Matthew
Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333,
375 (1995).
29. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 6, On International Recognition of the Socialist Republic
of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States, Jan 11, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1507. The
EC decided not to recognize Macedonia despite the Badinter Commission's opinion that it should,
because of the Greek veto. See Acquaviva, supra note l, at 178.
30. Acquaviva, supra note l, at 178 n. 20 (citing The United Nations recognized Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on May 22, 1992 (U.N. Press Release, ORG/1156, Jan. 19, 1993)).
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. 31 The political environment throughout the
former Yugoslav states was one of hostility and violence, thus preventing effective
negotiations among parties from talcing place.
2.

Dissolution Versus Secession and Related Succession Issues

According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties32 and the Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, 33 the succession of states is defined as "the replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory."34 In cases
of universal succession, the predecessor state ceases to exist. For example, when
Zanzibar and Tanganyika decided to unite in 1964, they ceased to exist and a new
state, Tanzania, was formed. 35 In other cases, however, the predecessor state can
remain in existence. When the Thirteen colonies seceded from Great Britain, the
latter was not affected in its existence. 36 This principle does not mean, however,
that all of the obligations of the predecessor state remain in force as if nothing had
happened: some may be passed on to the successor state, some may remain in the
realm of the predecessor state, some may be transformed, and some may cease to
exist. Thus, the modification of a state does not automatically entail the
modification of its obligations. 37
In the context of former Yugoslavia, neither one of the simple hypoµteses
applies. On the contrary, there is significant debate about whether the state
succession that occurred represented "dissolution" or "secession." 38
The
terminology, far from causing purely semantic issues, implies important legal
consequences and differing conclusions regarding debt and asset allocation among
the former Yugoslav states.39

31. See S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RESn52 (1992), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 1451,
1452 (demanding compliance with the April 12, 1992 cease-fire and urging to stop "violent
deterioration" of the situation) and S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RESn57 (1992), reprinted
in 31 l.L.M. 1453, 1454 (calling for "immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and attempts to change
the ethnic composition of the populace").
32. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23, 1978, 17
l.L.M. 1488, 1490.
33. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, April 8, 1983, 22
I.L.M. 298, 308. However, this Convention has never entered into force and it is largely thought not to
reflect customary international law. See Eli Nathan, The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY:
EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABATI ROSENNE 489 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
34. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 32, at 1490;
Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 308.
35. See DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1967); The Acts of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Apr. 27, 1964, 3
l.L.M. 763, 764.
36. See O'Connell, supra note 35, at 88-91.
37. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 185.
38. Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188-89.
39. For a more detailed discussion on dissolution v. secession in general as well as in the context
of former Yugoslavia, see Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 185-94.
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If the former SFRY fell apart through decay of its institutions and through
transfer of sovereign powers from the federation back to the republics, then the
dismantlement process would be one of dissolution. Furthermore, the armed
conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be deemed an aggression.
On the other hand, if the SFRY disappeared by the secession of several republics,
then the conflict would amount to a civil war because the "act of secession violated
the right to self-determination" of the Serb minorities living in the seceding
republics. 40
The legal consequences of the above distinction are crucial. If SFRY fell apart
because of dissolution, all emerging states founded from its former republics would
have the same position in the succession process. The question of war reparations
could also arise. In the case of secession, however, FRY would retain the
international personality of the former SFRY and its position would be politically
and juridically strengthened, thus excluding the issue of war damages. The
Badinter Commission solved this legal dilemma. 41 In Opinion No. 1, dated
November 29, 1991, the Commission stated "the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution."42 Furthermore, Opinion No. 8, dated
July 4, 1992, confirmed this conclusion, by stating "the process of dissolution of
the SFRY referred to in Opinion No. 1of29 November 1991 is now complete and
. . . the SFRY no longer exists."43 Finally, in Opinion No. 10 the Badinter
Commission affirmed that "the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state which
cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY."44 Because FRY contested
the binding character of these opinions while the other successor states adhered to
them, compromise was greatly needed regarding the most contentious issues.
Thus, all participants agreed to "refrain from using the terms 'dissolution' and
'secession,' the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 should not be quoted by titles and articles,
and the technical rules of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted so as to
encompass rules common to both dissolution and secession ... when feasible." 45
The issue of debt and asset allocation among the successor states required
more negotiations. A fundamental rule that resulted from the Badinter Commission
required successor states to consult with each other to achieve an equitable result. 46
According to Opinion No. 13, there was no need to divide assets and liabilities
proportionally, but the overall result should be an equitable division. 47
40. See Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188.
41. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, reprinted in Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination ofPeoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 178, app. 182-83 (1992).
42. Id. at 183.
43. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 8, reprinted in Danilo Turk, Recognition of States: A
Comment, 4 EUROP. J. INT'L. L. 66, 74 Annex 3 (1993); Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, supra
note 41, at 182.
44. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 10, reprinted in Danilo Turk, Recognition of States: A
Comment, 4 EUROP. J. INT'L. L. 66, 74 Annex 3 (1993).
45. See Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188-89.
46. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 9, July 4, 1992, 31 l.L.M. 1523, 1523-25.
47. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 13, July 16, 1992, 321.L.M. 1591, 1591-92.
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Furthermore, all successor states had an obligation to cooperate actively and in
good faith; if they were to refuse, they would encounter state responsibility toward
other successor states for damages. 48 Because of already heightened regional
tensions among successor states, and because of the violent and disputed breakup
of former Yugoslavia, peaceful negotiations regarding debt and asset allocation
were impossible among the new states. Thus, Slovenia adopted a different
solution, consisting of dealing with creditors on a bilateral basis, thereby excluding
the other successors from the procedure. Other republics started to follow the same
approach shortly thereafter. 49 Consequently, an agreement among all successor
states was much needed to provide an efficient overall solution to the issue of
property allocation.
3.

Allocation of Debts - The Vienna Agreement

The newly formed states of the former Yugoslavia faced many challenges
regarding property issues. First, successor states had to reschedule and eventually
pay dues to international creditors. 50 In order to do so, FRY had to reach an
effective and feasible apportionment of the unallocated debts of former Yugoslavia,
which required its government to give up the claim of being the sole successor of
the SRFY. 5 ' Thus, an important agreement was signed in Vienna on June 29, 2001
(the "Vienna Agreement"). 52 The Vienna Agreement built upon the deals already
entered by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, trying to
reach a consensus acceptable to the FRY, which had acted as the "rogue" state until
that moment. 53 In particular, the Vienna Agreement divided the financial liabilities
of the former Yugoslavia into three main categories. First, allocated debt, external
debt whose beneficiary was located in the territory of a specific successor state or
group of states, remains with the successor state where the final beneficiary is
located. 54 Second, SFRY's external official unallocated debt to members of the
Paris and London Clubs is to be dealt with according to already negotiated deals by
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, whereas FRY is to
assume responsibility for all of its unallocated debt by negotiating directly with the
members of the two clubs. 55 The corollary of this rule is that successor states are to
"terminate any existing legal proceedings or financial claims among each other and

48. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 12, July, 16, 1992, 32 l.L.M. 1589, 1590.
49. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 206.
50. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212.
51. The new FRY government headed by Vojislav Kostunica seemed to have already given up
the previous position, held by Slobodan Milosevic, thus facilitating the road to negotiations. See IMF
Approves Yugoslavia's Membership in Fund, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2000.
52. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 3. In May of 2001, the central bankers of former
Yugoslav republics met with the international mediator, Sir Arthur Watts, to agree on the apportionment
of assets of former Yugoslavia according to the IMF key with some minor variations. The consensus
reached at this meeting is reflected in the Vienna Agreement.
53. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212.
54. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 25 Annex C.
55. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212.
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avoid instituting new proceedings or claims." 56 Finally, the third category of
financial liabilities is comprised of all claims against the SPRY not otherwise
covered by the Vienna Agreement. These claims are to be raised by each successor
state and to be subsequently considered by the Joint Committee established under
the Vienna Agreement itself. 57
Although the Vienna Agreement resolved some of the problems related to debt
and asset allocation among former Yugoslav republics, several contentious issues
have plagued the negotiation process. In particular, the division of former
Yugoslavia's assets rekindled political and historical disputes among successor
states.
B.

Specific Succession Disputes: Division ofState Assets

In February of 1993, a tentative inventory made by independent consultants
estimated the net assets of the SPRY as of December 31, 1990 at $60 billion.58
Military assets represented 75 per cent of the above sum, immovable assets 3.4 %
and financial assets 21.6 %. 59 The division of these assets proved to be a daunting
task.
1.

Six Points of Contention Among Successor States

In fact, six sticking points in the negotiations regarding asset division evolved.
First, the scope and definition of state property was a major point of contention
between the FRY and the other successor states. 00 While all parties agreed that the
definition of state property set out in Article 8 of the Vienna Convention in Respect
of State Property, Archives and Debts ("Vienna Convention")61 applied, "the four
successor states regard[ed] this definition as a rule of international law, while the
FRY's view was not clear."62 In fact, the Vienna Convention defines state property
in terms of the municipal law of the predecessor state as of the date of succession. 63
Thus, one must look into domestic law of the predecessor state to determine the
scope of the concept of state property. The dispute between the FRY and the other

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 212-13.
Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 35 Annex F.
See Ana Stanic, Financial Aspects ofState Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUROP. J.
I'NTL. L. 751, 755 (2001) (citing Working Groups on Economic Succession Issues of the International
Conference, "Single Inventory of Assets and Liabilities of the SFRY as of 31 December 1990",
February 28, 1993). The figure is in U.S. dollars.
59. In comparison, as of the end of 1991, the total medium-term and long-term debt of former
Yugoslavia amounted to US $15.99 billion, of which US $3.79 billion was unallocated and US $12.2
billion was allocated debt. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 758.
60. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 763. The four other successor states include Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
61. Article 8 provides that state property means "property, rights and interest which, at the date
of the succession of States, were, according to the internal law of the predecessor State, owned by that
State." Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 310.
·
62. Stanic, supra note 58, at 763.
63. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 310.
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four successor states relates to the scope of state property under SFRY's domestic
law. 64 According to the FRY, "nothing similar to state property existed in the
SFRY and ... what constituted state property could only be determined by looking
at investments and loans made by the federal state authorities and other federal
funds since 1945."6' The FRY had therefore rejected the legal approach in defining
state property in favor of an economic approach. This approach was rejected by all
four successor states and by the Badinter Commission. 66 According to the four
successor states, a legal approach could and had to be taken to define the SFRY's
property, by reference to federal laws in force at the date of succession.
Furthermore, the four successor states contended that the past investment approach
was unworkable as too long and burdensome. 67 Thus, the concept of state property
remained a troubling as it related to asset allocation among former Yugoslav states.
Second, the issue of internal financial assets and whether these constitute state
property has been problematic in succession negotiations. ''The FRY has argued
that internal net financial assets also form part of the SFRY's state property."68 In
other words, according to the FRY, the net credit position of each republic
regarding the federal government must be determined, and the financial capital
flows between the federal government and the republics, corporations and natural
persons located in them must be calculated. However, because the FRY claimed
that as the sole successor of the SFRY it represented the federal government, its
contention was that only the creditor position of the four successor states vis-a-vis
the federal government should have been determined. 69 Thus, under this approach,
all other republics, except for Slovenia, would have owed money to the federal
government, or the FRY. 70 The four successor states rejected this approach. They
argued that such an approach was unprecedented under relevant international state
practice and that the adoption of such an approach would have amounted to double
counting in accounting terms. 71 Furthermore, assuming that the internal assets
method was adopted, the FRY's net position vis-a-vis the federal government
should have also been taken into account, as it was one of the successor states.
Finally, the four successor states have argued that the "internal financial assets
approach is unnecessary" and almost "impossible to carry out." 72 Instead, the four
successor states argued that it would have been simpler to divide the federal
64. Stanic, supra note 58, at 763-64.
65. Id. at 764 (citing Article 20 of the FRY's Draft Agreement Between the FRY and the
Successor States, May 4, 1993; Mihajlovic, Ozbiljnije o sukcesiji [Seriously About Succession], VREME,
March 2001 (letter from Mihajlovic, the head of the FRY's negotiating team, to a Serbian newspaper,
"Vreme")).
66. Id. (citing Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 11, 321.L.M. 1586, 1587).
67. The four successor states also contended that many loan documents had been lost or
destroyed since some of them dated as far back as 1945. See id. at 764-65.
68. Id. at 765.
69. However, since the FRY has since conceded that it is not the sole successor of the SFRY, it
has abandoned this position. See Vienna Agreement, supra note 2; see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
70. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 765.
71. Id. at 765-66.
72. Id. at 766.
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balance sheet for the last budget, on December 31, 1990, "by reference to net
external financiaJ assets." 73
The third sticking point in the negotiations was that the FRY's historic claim to
certain state property undermined the negotiations process regarding asset division.
The FRY has claimed "that property of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro
and the parts of former Austro-Hungarian monarchy as at the date of the
establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918 should not be included in the
definition of the SFRY's property." 74 As part of this historic claim, the FRY has
argued that it is the only successor to the SFRY's shares in, and gold reserves held
at, the Bank for IntemationaJ Settlements ("BIS"). 75 In fact, according to the FRY,
the gold deposited in the BIS belonged to the Kingdom of Serbia because it was the
Kingdom of Serbia that was allocated shares in the BIS upon its creation as war
reparation for the damage suffered by this Kingdom in the First World War and
because the FRY is the sole successor of the Kingdom of Serbia. 76 The BIS
rejected the FRY's claim as sole successor to the gold and shares mentioned above.
It froze all of the SFRY's gold reserves and shares. 77 In 1997, the BIS invited the
centraJ banks of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia to subscribe for a
nominal number of new shares, thereby enabling them to become members of the
BIS. 78 The old SFRY shares were finaJly apportioned using the key method agreed
upon by all successor states in the Vienna Agreement. 79
The fourth issue in asset distribution among former Yugoslav republics was
whether equitable compensation must be made by the FRY to other successor states
as a consequence of it becoming the owner of most of the SFRY's immovable
property. 80 According to customary internationaJ law, immovable property within
the territory of a successor state passes to that state in case of dissolution or
secession. 81 In the case of former Yugoslavia, most of the federaJ organs,
institutions, research institutions of the federaJ army, military instaJlations and
factories were located in Serbia. Thus, the adoption of the territoriaJ principle
would have resulted in an inequitable distribution of the SFRY's net assets because
the FRY would have received a larger portion of SFRY's assets than liabilities. 82
The four successor states have argued that the rule of equitable compensation is a

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. However, for the FRY to be the successor of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, these
Kingdoms would have to have continued to exist as separate entities throughout the existence of both
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the SFRY. The FRY's argument is similar to the one invoked by the
Baltic States regarding their absorption into the USSR. It should be noted, though, that the case of the
Kingdom of Serbia is different because this Kingdom voluntarily entered into the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia after the First World War and thus ceased to exist upon the latter country's foundation. Id.
77. Id. at 767.
78. See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Fifth issue of shares in the third
tranche of the BIS' s capital, (May 12, 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p9705 l 2b.htm.
79. See infra, note 97 regarding specific asset distribution key of the Vienna Agreement.
80. Stanic, supra note 58, at 767.
81. See Brownlie, supra note l, at 658.
82. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 767-68.
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rule of international law and is an application of the principle of equity.B3 The FRY
has rejected this contention and has argued that the principle of equitable
compensation has no basis in international law. 84
Fifth, the issue of division of immovable assets situated abroad has been
contentious in the negotiations process.Bs These assets include the diplomatic and
consular missions abroad, which were mostly in the hands of the FRY. Initially,
the FRY objected to the apportionment of immovable assets located abroad. It
claimed that as the continuing state, it should be entitled to all immovable assets
abroad under international law. 86 However, in 1992 the FRY indicated that it would
agree to divide immovable assets among successor states.B7 Thus, the issue
between the parties turned to what key method should be used to divide such
assets. As early as 1993, the four successor states agreed to an equitable division
under international law88 using the following key: Bosnia 13 %, Croatia 27.2 %, the
FRY 35.3 %, Macedonia 8.5 %, and Slovenia 16 %. 89 However, because the FRY
did not initially agree to the above-mentioned key method proposed in 1993, the
issue was not fully resolved until the Vienna Agreement.
The issue. of movable property division proved to be the sixth and final
sticking point. "Financial assets represented the major share of the SFRY's
movable property and 21.6 % of its total assets. The foreign exchange reserves of
[the National Bank of Yugoslavia] stood at U.S. $6 billion as [of] December 31,
1990. Other assets included quotas accorded to the SFRY as a member of the BIS,
the IMF, and the World Bank."90 Under international law, in the case of dissolution
all movable property should be apportioned proportionately between the successor
states. 91 However, international law on the apportionment of movable property

83. Id. at 768.
84. Id..
85. Id.
86. The rule of public international law in case of secession regarding succession to such assets
is not completely settled. Some authors argue that because no rule covering such property is spelled out
in Article 17 of the Geneva Convention, a different rule applies in the case of secession. Other others
argue that there is no rule of customary international law on this point. See Daniel Desjardins & Claude
Gendron, Legal Issues Concerning the Division of Assets and Debt in State Succession: The Canada
Quebec Debate, in CLOSING THE BOOKS: DNIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS
UP 11 (John McCallum, ed., 1991). However, the USSR case of secession where ex-USSR property
abroad was to be apportioned between Russia and other successor states on an equitable basis is
evidence of recent state practice pointing to the same rule on the division of immovable assets as in the
case of dissolution. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 769, n.91.
87. Id. at 769, n.92 (citing Cedic, Cija je imovina u inostranstvu [Whose Property is Abroad],
PoLmKA, February l, 1997, at 3).
88. State practice and doctrine seem to support the view that under international law immovable
assets situated abroad should be apportioned to the successor states in the case of dissolution. See id. at
768, n.88; O' Connell, supra note 35, at 207. This rule is confirmed as customary international law in
Article 18(l)(b) of the Convention. Other examples of state practice confirm this view: (1) the case of
the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963; and (2) the agreement between
Norway and Sweden of March 23, 1906. Stanic, supra note 58, at 768, n.88.
89. Stanic, supra note 58, at 768-69.
90. Id.
91. See O'Connell, supra note 35, at 204.
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held abroad in the case of secession seems unsettled. 92 Before the FRY conceded
its claim to be the sole successor to the SFRY, the division of such assets would
have been difficult because of the differing international law rules regarding
dissolution and secession.93 However, even after the FRY agreed to divide movable
property among all successor states, the process turned out to be complicated
because most such assets were in the hands of the FRY. "In fact, the FRY ha[d]
spent almost all of the above-mentioned foreign currency reserves of the SFRY to
finance its war machine." 94 Furthermore, some of the loans owed by the former
Soviet Union and Iraq to the SFRY seem to have been settled by Milosevic in
return for oil and gas supplies.9s Finally, almost all military assets had been under
the control of the FRY since 1990 and had been destroyed by the time the Vienna
agreement was reached. 96 Thus, the actual division of such movable assets was no
longer possible and another division key method had to be agreed upon.
While the Vienna Agreement provided some solutions to the division of
former Yugoslavia's assets, 97 its reach may be of limited importance regarding
individual property disputes.

92. Under one doctrinal proposition, the territorial principle governs the succession of such
movables and all movable property passes to the successor state in which it is situated. See Malcolm N.
Shaw, The Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L. 34, 93 (1994). According to a second
proposition, there should be a distinction between the case of dissolution and secession. Only movable
assets which can be identified with immovables in the seceding territory pass to that successor state in
the case of secession while others remain the property of the predecessor state. In the case of
dissolution, all movable property is apportioned proportionately between the successor states. See
O'Connell, supra note 35, at 204. Finally, Articles l 7(l)(c) and 18(l)(d) of the Vienna Convention
adopt the principle of equitable apportionment in the case of movables irrespective of their location and
with no distinction based on the nature of the state succession. See Vienna Convention in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 314-15. State practice in this area of law does not
seem to support fully any of the above propositions. However, in the cases of Syria and
Czechoslovakia, financial assets held in international organizations were apportioned according to
Articles 17 and 18 of the Vienna Convention. Stanic, supra note 58, at 770, n.96.
93. In fact, while the FRY claimed to be the sole successor to the SFRY, it claimed that the
breakup of former Yugoslavia amounted to secession by other successor states. However, this view was
unsupported by the Badinter Commission, and by all other successor states. See infra, Part 1.A.2 for a
full discussion on the difference between secession and dissolution.
94. Stanic, supra note 58, at 771.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Vienna Agreement apportioned the assets of former Yugoslavia according to the IMF
key with minor variations. The assets held by the BIS are apportioned as follows under the Vienna
Agreement: FRY 36.52 per cent; Croatia 28.49 per cent; Slovenia 16.33 per cent; Bosnia and
Herzegovina 13.26 per cent; Macedonia 5.40 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 7.
Immovable assets abroad were divided under a different key: FRY 39.5 per cent; Croatia 23.5 per cent;
Slovenia 14.0 per cent; Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.0 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 9
10. Other financial assets (including gold deposits, various foreign currency deposits, and securities)
whether held by the SFRY or the National Bank of Yugoslavia were apportioned as follows: Bosnia and
Herzegovina 15.5 per cent; Croatia 23.0 per cent; Macedonia 7.5 per cent; Slovenia 16.0 per cent; FRT
38.0 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 27. Immovable property located within the territory
of the SFRY shall pass to the successor state on whose territory that property is situated, except for
tangible movable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of one of the successor states and
which originated from the territory of that state. See the Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, for the full
text regarding asset division.
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Individual Disputes Regarding Debt and Asset Division in Former Yugoslavia

Many citizens of former Yugoslavia have lost property as a result of the
country's violent breakup and the terrible financial situation that has plagued most
successor states. Furthermore, as a result of the SFRY's geographical and political
decomposition, some citizens' historic claims dating to the Second World War
might now be extremely difficult to adjudicate. While the Vienna Agreement
provides an overall asset allocation key, it does not address any of the individual
grievances resulting from the former Yugoslavia's dismantlement. Thus, such
individuals might be inclined to turn to foreign jurisdictions for efficient relief and
substantial remedies.
Let us address two of the many possible scenarios. First, suppose that Mr. X is
Serbian98 but that he lived and worked in Croatia until the early 1990s. Mr. X
owned a house, as well as other movable assets, in his hometown. As the internal
war erupted in his region, Mr. X, fearing his safety in Croatia, fled his home and
moved to Serbia. Mr. X lost his house and all other assets and has been living with
relatives in Serbia, without money or any other belongings. Mr. X would like to
bring his lost property claim to some forum, but has so far been unsuccessful in
doing so. For one, the Croatian courts rejected his claim arguing that Mr. X's
house was actually destroyed during bombings by the Serbian army and that Mr. X
should thus turn to the Serbian government for reparations. Second, the Serbian
courts have denied the Croatian courts' argument and claim that Mr. X's property
was illegally confiscated by the Croatian government. According to the Serbian
courts, Mr. X should seek monetary restitution from the government of Croatia. In
this situation, what other remedies could Mr. X seek? The Vienna Agreement
provides limited, if any, solutions to this problem. 99 The former Yugoslavia's
judicial systems have rejected Mr. X's plight. It seems that the only possible
solution for Mr. X would be to seek redress in a foreign jurisdiction.
Second, suppose that Mr. Y is Serbian, but that during World War II, he lived
in Croatia, where he owned property. His property was confiscated by the
communist regime immediately following World War II. Mr. Y decides to seek
restitution for this property loss in 2000, after the SFRY's breakup, and brings a
claim in Serbian courts. The Serbian courts reject Mr. Y's claim because his
property is located in Croatia, thus now outside of the FRY's territory. Mr. Y then
turns to Croatian courts, but they also reject him. stating that as a non-Croatian
citizen, he cannot seek restitution in Croatia, and that he should turn to his own
government for monetary compensation. Just like the above example of Mr. X, Mr.
Y seems to be in dire straits when it comes to the former Yugoslavia's judicial
system. Similarly, the Vienna Agreement is of limited utility in this situation.

98.
The term "Serbian" in this context means that Mr. X is ethnically Serbian; also, Mr. X in this
context has become a citizen of the FRY after former Yugoslavia's breakup.
99.
Note the difficulty of the issue of war reparations, which is linked to this fact pattern and
which is discussed above, see supra Part l.A.2. Furthermore, note that this issue is not addressed by the
Vienna Agreement.
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Thus, Mr. Y might, exactly like Mr. X, decide to seek the help of foreign courts and
judicial bodies.
As of the date of this article, only one international tribunal has claimed
jurisdiction over claims held by citizens of former Yugoslav republics. 100 Its future
decision on the merits will certainly shed more light on complicated succession
issues. However, its acceptance of jurisdiction might instigate more former
Yugoslav states and more private litigants to bring their claims before other
international fora.
Republics might sue other republics in the ICJ, arbitration panels might
conduct proceedings among governments, and private litigants might also tum to
specific tribunals seeking relief. Whether the United States will prove to be an
attractive forum for former Yugoslav states and private plaintiffs may tum on the
judicial implementation of a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Republic ofAustria v.
Altmann.w•
II. THE ALTMANN DECISION

In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the jurisdictional reach
of the FSIA of 1976!02 The FSIA authorizes federal civil suits against foreign
states "as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state
is not entitled to immunity" 103 under another section of the FSIA or under an
international agreement. Under the Altmann holding, the FSIA also applies to
conduct or alleged wrongdoing that occurred prior to the FSIA's 1976 enactment
and even prior to the United States' 1952 adoption of the so-called "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity.
A.

The FSIA and Its History in American Courts

The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally deferred sovereign immunity decisions
to the executive branch!04 Until 1952, executive policy was to automatically
request immunity in all proceedings against friendly sovereigns. 105 However, in
that year, the State Department began applying the "restrictive theory," 106 whereby
l 00.
The first international tribunal which has claimed jurisdiction over such a dispute is the
European Court of Human Rights. See Kovacic, Mrkonjic & Golubovic, Decision on Admissibility of
Application Nos. 44574/98, 45133/98 & 48316/99 (April 1st, 2004), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/.
IO l.
124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004 ). At the time of this article, full cite for this decision to the official
Supreme Court reporter was not available.
102.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, l602-l6ll (2000).
103.
28 U.S.C. § l330(a) (2000).
104.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248.
Id.
105.
106.
See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Acting U.S.
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952)
[hereinafter Tate Letter]. Under the Tate Letter, "According to the newer or restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) .... [l]t will hereafter be the
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immunity is recognized with respect to a foreign sovereign for public acts, but not
for its private acts.
Even though the change had little impact on federal courts' approach to
immunity analysis, 107 the new policy caused havoc regarding immunity
determinations. Foreign nations exercised diplomatic pressure to prompt the State
Department to file suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not
have been available under the restrictive theory, whereas when foreign countries
failed to ask the State Department for immunity, the courts had to determine
themselves whether immunity existed. Thus, responsibility for such determinations
existed with two different government branches. 108 In order to remedy this
problem, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory and transferred primary
responsibility for immunity decisions to the judicial branch. 100 Federal courts have
jurisdiction under the FSIA over civil actions against foreign states. 11° Foreign
states are generally granted immunity but the FSIA carves out specific exceptions
under which immunity is denied. In other words, the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction depends on the availability of one of those exceptions.
While the FSIA's substantive provisions seem relatively clear, its applicability
to pre-enactment conduct is not. The U. S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in
the Altmann decision by responding to the following issue: does the FSIA apply to
conduct which occurred prior to its enactment in 1976, and more specifically, prior
to the State Department's 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity?
B.

The Altmann Holding

The respondent in this case, Maria Altmann, discovered that certain of her
uncle's valuable pieces of art work had either been seized by the Nazis or
expropriated by Austria after World War II. She filed an action in Federal District
Court against the petitioners, the Republic of Austria and the Austrian Gallery, an
instrumentality of the Republic of Austria, asserting jurisdiction under Section 2 of
the FSIA, 111 which generally authorizes federal civil suits against foreign states.
She also claimed that petitioners were not entitled to immunity under the FSIA's
expropriation exception, 112 which expressly exempts from immunity certain cases
involving "rights in property taken in violation of international law." 113 Petitioners

Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory... in the consideration of requests of foreign
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity." Id.
107.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (noting that because
"[a]s in the past, initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon
the Executive acting through the State Department," courts thus continued to abide by the State
Department's suggestions of immunity).
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
108.
109.
28 u.s.c. § 1602 (2000).
110.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000).
lll.
Id.
112.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000).
Id.
113.
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moved to dismiss the case based on a two-part claim. First, according to the
petitioners, as of 1948, when the alleged wrongdoing took place, they would have
enjoyed absolute sovereign immunity from suit in the U.S. courts because the
United States did not adopt the restrictive theory of immunity until 1952. 114
Second, nothing in the FSIA retroactively divests them of immunity. The District
Court rejected this argument by concluding, inter alia, that the FSIA applies
retroactively to pre-1976 actions. 115 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirrned,1 16 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 111 The Supreme
Court, which limited its holding to one issue oflaw, 118 held that the FSIA applies to
conduct that occurred prior to the Act's 1976 enactment as well as conduct prior to
the United States' 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 119
The Supreme Court began its analysis by distinguishing this decision from an
earlier case, Landgraf v. US/ Film Products. 120 In Landgraf, the Supreme Court
described the general presumption against retroactive application of a statute. It
declared that if a federal law enacted after the events in suit does not expressly
prescribe its own proper reach but does operate retroactively, "it does not govern
absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. " 121 In other words, if a
statute would impair rights that a party possessed when she acted, if it would
"increase her liability for past conduct," or if it would "impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed, such a statute is not to be applied to pre
enactment conduct absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. 122 According
to the Supreme Court, none of the categories in Landgraf can be applied to foreign
sovereign immunity law under the FSIA. 123 However, the FSIA is not simply a
jurisdictional rule, but a codification of "the standards governing foreign sovereign
immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law." 12• While the FSIA's preamble
suggests that the statute applies to pre-enactment conduct, 125 the statement falls
short of the requisite express congressional prescription. Therefore, the Landgraf s
default rule does not resolve this case. 126

114.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2243 (2004).
115.
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199-01 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
116.
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003).
117.
For a full discussion on the factual background and procedural posture of the Altmann case,
see Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2243-45 (2004) (factual background) and 2245-47 (procedural posture).
118.
Id. at 2243. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the
FSIA "applies to claims that, like respondent's, are based on conduct that occurred before the Act's
enactment, and even before the United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
1952." Id.
119.
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling but on different grounds. For a
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, see id. at 2247.
120.
511U.S.244 (1994). Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
121.
Altmann 124 S. Ct. at 2250-2251.
122.
Id. at 2250-51 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
123.
Id. at 2251-52.
124.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank ofNig., 461U.S.480, 497 (1983).
125.
The FSIA preamble states that "henceforth" both federal and state courts should decide
claims of sovereign immunity in conformity with FSIA's principles. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
126.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the particular nature of foreign
sovereign immunity law, the purpose of which is to give foreign states some
present protection from the inconvenience of a lawsuit. 127 It is thus more
appropriate, in this context, to defer to the most recent decisions of the political
branches on whether to accept jurisdiction than to presume that political decision
inapplicable just because it postdates the conduct in question. 128 According to the
Supreme Court, nothing in the FSIA or the circumstances surrounding its
enactment suggests that it should not be applied to pre-enactment actions. In fact,
the Supreme Court relied on the FSIA's preamble language that "henceforth",
foreign states' immunity claims should be decided by American courts in
conformity with the statute's principles. 129 Thus, assertions of immunity by foreign
states to lawsuits arising from actions protected by immunity are the relevant
conduct regulated by the FSIA and are henceforth to be decided by the U.S. courts.
Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims under the FSIA principles
regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. 130
The FSIA's overall structure also supports this conclusion. First, many of its
provisions "apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred before 1976,"131 and
its procedural provisions apply to all pending cases. "It would [thus] be anomalous
to presume that an isolated provision (such as the expropriation exception at stake
in this case) is of purely prospective application absent any statutory language to
that effect." 132 Second, the FSIA's applicability to "all pending cases regardless of
when the underlying conduct occurred is most consistent with two of the [statute's]
principal purposes: clarifying the rules that judges should apply in resolving
sovereign immunity claims and eliminating political participation in the resolution
of such claims." 133 Finally, the Supreme Court noted that nothing in its holding
prevented the State Department from "filing statements of interest suggesting that
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in particular cases implicating foreign
sovereign immunity." 134
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority opinion, emphasizing FSIA's
jurisdictional nature. According to Justice Scalia, "the FSIA affects substantive
rights only accidentally, and not as a necessary and intended consequence of the
law." 135 Justice Breyer also concurred with the majority opinion, while pointing out
that the legal concept of sovereign immunity was "about a defendant's status at the
127.
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003).
128.
According to the Supreme Court, "the principal purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has
never been to permit foreign states and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the
promise of future immunity from suit in United States Courts. Rather, such immunity reflects current
political realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states and their instrumentalities some
present 'protection from the inconvenience; of suit as a gesture of comity."' Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252
(quoting Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 479).
129.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 2255.
Id. at 2556 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135.
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time of suit," and not necessarily "about a defendant's conduct before the suit." 136
Thus, an expropriating nation cannot rely at the time of taking, when other
countries applied absolute foreign sovereign immunity, "that other nations will
continue to protect it from future lawsuits by continuing to apply the same
unrestricted sovereign immunity doctrine." 137
Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissented from the majority
opinion. According to the dissent, written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
had to weaken its reasoning and to diminish the rule against the retroactivity of
statutes. 138
Furthermore, the majority opinion weakened the rule against
retroactivity in the area of foreign sovereign immunity, where numerous treaties
and agreements had been reached to the contrary. 139 According to the dissent, the
majority opinion also injected further insecurity into this area of law, by suggesting
that the executive branch has power to intervene regarding sovereign immunity
determinations. In fact, the dissent found that the majority opinion's "reasoning
also implies a problematic answer to a separation-of-powers question" that the
majority opinion seems to avoid. 140 According to the dissent, the ultimate result of
the ruling will be to invite foreign nations to pressure the executive, thereby risking
"inconsistent results" for private citizens "based on changes and nuances in foreign
affairs." 141
The FSIA's temporal application has thus been expanded by the majority
holding in the Altmann decision. While the ruling of this case remains extremely
narrow,' 42 its implications for potential claims against foreign states, such as former
Yugoslav republicsi in U.S. courts are particularly important.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTMANN ON FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES
In light of the Altmann decision, more litigants with outstanding claims against
foreign sovereigns may be attracted to American courts. For one, foreign states'
possible defenses under the FSIA will be limited under the Altmann precedent.
Also, this decision might indicate that the Supreme Court's view of foreign
immunity has changed, and that it is less willing to excuse foreign states' behavior
in order to shield them from suit in the United States. The Altmann precedent might
thus encourage plaintiffs from former Yugoslavia, especially ones with illegal
expropriation claims, to seek relief in U.S. district courts.
The implications of the Altmann decision for former Yugoslav states remain
uncertain, especially in light of other jurisdictional and substantive defenses that
have not been altered by the case's holding and that such states will be able to
. assert. Nonetheless, while one might wonder about the justification and the utility
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

, Id. at 2559 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. al 2263 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.

See infru part Dl(B).
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of a multiplication of claims against former Yugoslav republics in U.S. courts, this
outcome seems reasonable and fair in certain circumstances.

A.

FSIA-New Jurisdictional Basis against Former Yugoslav Republics?

Potential litigants and claimholders against foreign states, in particular against
the former Yugoslav republics, might turn to international tribunals in order to seek
relief instead of going through their own countries' often slow and inefficient
judicial systems. Such litigants might also be attracted to U.S. courts where
prospects of efficient monetary recovery might seem better. In light of the Altmann
decision, the foreign sovereigns, including former Yugoslav states, might be more
limited in exercising their FSIA-based defenses. Furthermore, regardless of the
availability of defenses under the FSIA, the Altmann decision might indicate a new
willingness of U.S. courts to hear all reasonable claims against foreign sovereigns.
Let us imagine the following scenario: Mr. Z is a national of Macedonia, but
immigrated to the United States during the 1990s following Yugoslavia's internal
wars and dismantlement. Mr. Z owned property in Croatia, which was confiscated
by the pro-Nazi Croatian regime during World War II. Immediately before the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Z sought monetary restitution from the
Macedonian government for his confiscated property. 143 Macedonia, which did not
reach a decision until after its separation from former Yugoslavia, refused to
reimburse Mr. Z according to its territorial policy because Mr. Z's property was
located in Croatia. Mr. Z then decides to sue the government of Croatia for
unlawful expropriation in the U.S. courts. 144 Mr. Z asserts subject-matter
jurisdiction, like Ms. Altmann, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1330(a) of the FSIA.
Assuming that the U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and that
venue is proper, what jurisdictional defenses can Croatia raise in order to defeat
this claim before it reaches the merits?
Prior to the Altmann decision, Croatia could have argued that FSIA does not
apply to any pre-enactment conduct, and that it is immune from suit in U.S. courts
for its conduct, which occurred prior to 1976, and even prior to the United States'
adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity. After Altmann, however, this
defense is no longer available: according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the FSIA
applies to conduct which occurred prior to its 1976 enactment and foreign
sovereigns cannot expect to be protected from suit in American courts simply
because their alleged wrongdoing would have been protected under the absolute
immunity theory at the time of its occurrence. 145 Thus, Mr. Z could not have sued
143.
Prior to former Yugoslavia's breakup, Macedonia was a part of SPRY. The fact that Mr. Z's
property was located in Croatia would have been irrelevant because Croatia, too, was a part of the
SFRY. The federal government of the SFRY would have been responsible for restitution, regardless of
the fact that Mr. Z applied to his "local" government in Macedonia for alleged expropriation that
occurred in Croatia.
144.
Let us assume that Mr. Z has decided not to pursue restitution in Croatian courts because he
now lives in the U.S. and because he has heard that, because Croatian court proceedings are slow and
inefficient, he would have a better chance of recovery in American courts.
See Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J., concurring).
145.
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Croatia for unlawful expropriation in U.S. courts before 1952146 because Croatia
would have enjoyed absolute sovereign immunity. However, under Altmann, Mr. Z
can sue Croatia now, in 2004, for the same unlawful expropriation under the FSIA.
Croatia's conduct will not be immune, even though it occurred before the FSIA's
enactment and before the 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity.
Let us, however, imagine another scenario, more similar to the above
mentioned case of Mr. X. 1• 1 What if Mr. X also decided to sue the Republic of
Croatia in U.S. courts for unlawful expropriation under the FSIA, assuming that the
U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over Croatia and that venue is proper?
Arguably, this scenario has nothing to do with the Altmann ruling regarding the
applicability of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct, because the alleged
wrongdoing in Mr. X's case occurred well after the FSIA came into force in 1976.
However, the Altmann decision might affect the jurisdictional outcome of a Mr. X
like case. In Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated its willingness to hear
cases against foreign sovereigns, when such cases involve violations of
international law for which the sovereign could not have expected to be immune
forever in U.S. courts. According to Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion:
What taking in violation of international norms is likely to have been
influenced, not by politics or revolution, but by knowledge of, or
speculation about, the likely future shape of America's law of foreign
sovereign immunity? To suggest any such possibility, in respect to the
expropriations carried out by the Nazi or Communist regimes, or any other
such as I am aware, would approach the realm of fantasy. 148
This approach might suggest that the Supreme Court is not willing to allow foreign
sovereigns to use the FSIA as a shield, when their conduct was in violation of
superior norms, such as international law, and when jurisdiction of U.S. courts does
not seem entirely unreasonable or unfair. 149 Thus, the U.S. courts might tum out to
be a new alternative forum for claims against former Yugoslav republics, and in
particular, for claims involving the issue of restitution for unlawful expropriation.

146.
Assuming, of course, the availability of another statute other than the FSIA providing
subject-matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts, as FSIA was not enacted until 1976.
See supra Part l(B)(2).
147.
148.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring).
In fact, if the foreign government is being sued for violations of international law, the U.S.
149.
courts' jurisdiction is also founded under the universal jurisdiction principle. Even though this type of
jurisdiction has only been used for heinous violations of international law, such as terrorism or
genocide, see e.g. K. Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at
150; but see H. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2001, at 86, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Altmann might suggest a
"rapprochement" between universal jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the FSIA for less heinous
international law violations.

60

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 20:39

B. Limitations ofthe Altmann Holding

Despite the potential implications of the Altmann decision, ,,amely the
possibility for former Yugoslav republics to use the FSIA in order to "win"
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the case's holding remains extremely narrow.
First, the Supreme Court declined to comment on the issue of the "act of state"
doctrine.
Unlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which merely raises a
jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign states a
substantive defense on the merits. Under that doctrine, courts of one state
will not question the validity of public acts performed by other sovereigns
within their own borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a
controversy in which one of the litigants has· standing to c;:hallenge those
acts. 150
Instead, redress of grievances arising from such acts is· to be obtained through
diplomatic channels. 151 According to the Supreme Court, its determination that the
FSIA applies in this case in no way affects the application of the act .of state
doctrine. 152 Thus, in-a potential lawsuit by a Croati~n national against the FRY or
by a Serbian national against Croatia, a ·plaintiff might well be able to win
jurisdiction under the FSIA, but the defendant government will then be able to
resort to the act of state doctrine as a substantive defense on the merits.
Second, the Supreme Court rejected the United States' recommendation to bar
application of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct, but specifically stated that the
State Department is free to. file statements of interest regarding immunity
determinations in particular cases. m Because the issue in the case was one of
statutory construction, well within the realm of the judiciary branch, the State
Department's "views on such an issue ... merit no special deference." 154 However,
should the State Department choose to file a statement of interest regarding the
exercise of jurisdiction over a particular sovereign, "that opinion might well be
entitled to deference as" an executive judgment "on a particular question of foreign
policy."m For example, should the State Department file a statement of interest
advising against taking jurisdiction in one of the above succession issues among
former Yugoslav states, courts might be reluctant to go against the executive
branch and thus less inclined to accept jurisdiction over such disputes.

150.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254.
151.
See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1897); Banco Na!=ional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) ('The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes
the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recogniz:ed foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory").
See Altmann, 124 S. Ct at 2254-55.
152.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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Third, the Supreme Court refused to review the lower courts' determination
that the FSIA' s expropriation exception 1'6 applied. m In the case of former
Yugoslav republics, a court might find that jurisdiction could be available under the
FSIA, but that the taking in question did not amount to expropriation and that the
FSIA expropriation exception is thus not available. This conclusion would in fact
render the foreign government immune from suit under the FSIA, provided that no
other FSIA exceptions to immunity are available. Fourth, nothing in the ruling
suggests that foreign sovereigns will not be able to raise other jurisdictional
defenses such as statutes of limitations, personal jurisdiction, improper venue,
failure to join indispensable parties, or forum non conveniens. 158 Thus, many such
defenses will remain available to potential defendant governments from former
Yugoslav states. Fifth, the number of lawsuits will also be limited by the lower
courts' consensus that FSIA's reference to "violation of international law" does not
cover expropriations of property belonging to a country's own nationals. 159 Here, it
is worth noting that a national of Croatia would not be able to sue the Republic of
Croatia under the FSIA, because even if there had been a taking amounting to
expropriation, this violation would remain a purely domestic matter and the FSIA
would fail to provide jurisdictional grounds. Finally, even assuming that a plaintiff
is able to overcome all jurisdictional obstacles, her claim will remain subject to
substantive defenses, such as the above-mentioned act of state doctrine, which
might effectively prevent recovery from foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. Thus, a
plaintiff suing one of the former Yugoslav republics would have numerous
obstacles to overcome even after successfully establishing jurisdiction under the
FSIA.
C.

Utility and Fairness ofthe Altmann Decision

One might wonder about the utility of the Supreme Court's decision in
Altmann. Why did the supreme jurisdiction of the United States decide to limit
foreign sovereign immunity and to possibly multiply the number of lawsuits
against foreign states in U.S. courts? Was this a smart decision? Should the U.S.
courts be hearing claims against former Yugoslav republics and is there a better
forum for such claims?
Assuming that the private plaintiff, a national or former national of one of
former Yugoslav republics, lives in the United States, his use of American courts
does not seem unreasonable. To force such plaintiffs to litigate their claims in
156.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000). According to this exception, a foreign state shall not be
immune from suit in U.S. courts in any case "in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue ...". Id.
157.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2247, at 8, n.8.
158.
In fact, respondents in Altmann raised several such defenses, including forum non
conveniens, failure to join indispensable parties, and improper venue. Id. at 2246 n.6.
See 28 u.s.c. § 1605(a)(3) (2000); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
159.
THE UNITED STATES§ 712 (1986). Thus, neither Mr. X nor Mr. Ywould be able to sue the FRY for the
same alleged expropriation because they are citizens of the FRY and because the alleged wrongdoing
was a purely domestic dispute not in violation of international law.

62

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 20:39

other human rights tribunals or one of the "domestic" courts in some former
Yugoslav republic, would be unfair and would effectively prevent a number of
such claims from ever being litigated. First, it would be extremely expensive and
time-consuming for such plaintiffs to travel abroad, to the human rights tribunal's
location, or back to former Yugoslavia. Second, such plaintiffs might not be able
to obtain adequate representation in order to litigate abroad, either because they do
not know anybody, or because they are not familiar anymore with the judicial
systems. Third, either one of the former Yugoslav republics will certainly have
more resources to litigate in the United States and it seems entirely more fair to
force either one of them to U.S. courts than to tell the private plaintiff, living and
residing in the United States, that his claim in this country is precluded because of
foreign sovereign immunity. Finally, proceedings in most human rights tribunals
and former Yugoslavia are extremely slow and the prospects of execution remain
uncertain. 160
Furthermore, foreign sovereign immunity is a principle of comity and is aimed
to avoid embarrassment to foreign nations when they are dragged to American
courts over some alleged wrongdoings. 161 However, since 1952 it has been well
settled in American law that foreign sovereigns are immune from suit in U.S.
courts only for their public acts, but not for private acts. 162 Expropriation
doubtlessly amounts to a private act, and an expropriating nation can no longer
expect absolute immunity in the United States. The alleged expropriation in all
three above-mentioned scenarios represents a private act. Thus, nothing in the
foreign sovereign immunity concept, as applied and implemented today, suggests
that Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. Z should be denied access to American courts because
of comity or other diplomatic concerns.
Whether such arguments are equally strong regarding plaintiffs living and
residing abroad remains doubtful. 163 For one, none of the convenience, fairness,
and judicial economy arguments mentioned above applies in the case of abroad
domiciled plaintiffs. It would be equally expensive, time-consuming and difficult
for a plaintiff residing abroad to litigate in the United States as it would be to
litigate in another foreign country, be it the plaintiffs residence or not. Second, the
United States appears as a forum non conveniens in such a scenario, with no real
ties to the litigation or to the plaintiff. 164 Third, personal jurisdiction in civil
proceedings in the United States rests upon due process notions of "nexus,"

160.
Note that most international tribunals' rulings cannot force a country to provide effective
recovery to a plaintiff, as such plaintiff must still go through his country's judicial system to execute the
international decision.
161.
Altmann 124 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162.
Id. at 2269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
.
163.
If a plaintiff living and residing abroad were to bring a FSIA-based claim to U.S. courts,
arguments against taking jurisdiction based on improper venue.forum non conveniens, and pure judicial
economy become far more important.
164.
For examples of cases that were dismissed under the forum non conveniens theory, mainly
because alleged wrongdoings occurred abroad, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 US 235, 238 (1981)
and In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F.Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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"reasonableness," and "minimum contacts." 165 If a plaintiff domiciled abroad wants
to sue a foreign government for alleged expropriation that occurred abroad, it
seems that there is neither nexus nor minimum contacts with the United States, and
that such a lawsuit would be unreasonable. 166 Finally, in case of a U.S. domiciled
plaintiff, it seems reasonable to overcome comity and foreign policy concerns in
order to provide the individual plaintiff with an efficient forum and prospects of
recovery. On the other hand, in case of a plaintiff with no ties to the United States,
comity or this country's foreign relations policy might be sufficient to trump such
individual fairness concerns. In other words, the United States should not risk
embarrassment related to trying a foreign sovereign in an American court because
it should not have to protect plaintiffs domiciled abroad, with no substantial links
to this country.
It should be noted, however, that American courts are not likely to be
"flooded" with unreasonable claims by plaintiffs with no nexus with the United
States. Plaintiffs domiciled abroad are far less likely to tum to American courts
because of all the inconveniences described above related to the idea of litigating
abroad. Accordingly, the Altmann· holding seems fair to private plaintiffs and
justified for at least those plaintiffs who are presently residing in the United States.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that former Yugoslavia's succession issues cannot be resolved
internally and that some international involvement is necessary in order to provide
a neutral forum for such discussions and negotiation. 167 The same remains true for
claims held by private parties against successor states. One international court has
already accepted to act as a forum for dispute resolution among such litigants. A
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision might facilitate access to American courts as
well for the same claims. The utility and fairness of this decision, as has been
argued above, seem fully justified at least for those potential plaintiffs who are
residing in the United States. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which
has long ceased to be absolute, should not shield foreign governments from liability
for violations of international law. If American courts can remedy some of the
wrongdoings from former Yugoslavia, the Supreme Court is correct in allowing
them to do so.

165.
See, e.g., Int'! Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
166.
Even though it is not clear whether "minimum contacts," like personal jurisdiction, is also
required under the FSIA, it doesn't seem unreasonable to draw an analogy using this requirement in
order to discuss the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the FSIA.
167.
For example, an agreement on succession issues was not reached until 2001. This agreement
was negotiated with help of the international community and was signed in Vienna, Austria. See Vienna
Agreement, supra note 2.
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